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FINANCIALISATION AND THE 
FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS
THE CASE OF SOUTH AFRICA
The Nature and Form of 
Financialisation in South 
Africa is conditioned by 
industrial and financial 
developments before 1994.  
This is an edited abridgement 
from a paper produced by the 
Financialisation, Economy, 
Society and Sustainable 
Development (FESSUD) 
project, an extensive EU-
funded research programme.
 ver the past three decades  
 studies on financialisation  
 have rightly focused on the  
 emergence of the financial sector 
as the new economic vortex in advanced 
industrial societies. Like a veritable centre 
of gravity, it has sucked capital investment 
from other sectors and re-calibrated their 
orbits to the point that some resemble 
dying stars. Financialisation marks a 
turning point in advanced capitalism: from 
a base of production to the stratosphere of 
speculation. It manifests the choices that 
owners/investors make about their preference 
for what to do with the profits they earn. 
The effects of this shift from a production 
economy to a casino economy are now well 
documented and more popularly understood, 
thanks to the financial crisis of 2007 – 8. 
What is less known are the welter of effects 
financialisation has had on a number of 
other spheres of social and economic life in 
emerging economies. 
 Financialisation is generally traced back 
to the 1980s when a wave of conservatism 
swept across some advanced industrial 
countries, in particular the United States 
and the United Kingdom. However, the 
ideological father of this conservatism, 
which became known as neoliberalism, 
penned his ideas in 1960 (see the article 
by George Monbiot in this edition). Its 
effect has been wide and deep across the 
globe, and particularly devastating for the 
socio-economic development of the poor 
in countries of both the north and 
south. But what are the specific effects 
of financialisation in an emerging 
industrial country like South Africa? 
How exactly can we assess its impact? 
This is an aspect of the casino economy 
that has only recently been given serious 
attention. Newman’s study analyses 
some key financialisation indicators 
for South Africa across the areas of: 
financialisation and distribution; 
financialisation and consumption; 
financialisation and investment in the 
capital stock; and financialisation and 
the current account to aid comparison 
across country case studies.  
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While a global process, the form 
that financialisation has taken in 
South Africa and its implications on 
distribution and unemployment is 
conditioned upon the specific nature 
of industrialisation and economic 
development that extends further back 
in time then the era of financialisation 
often identified as beginning around 
1980. It is the particular industrial 
and economic structure that was 
built during this period that laid 
the foundations for the rapid 
financialisation and deindustrialisation 
of the economy from the early 1990s. 
As we will see below, 
financialisation of the South African 
economy has led to the reproduction 
of apartheid patterns of investment 
and thus the persistence of its skewed 
industrial structure with serious 
implications for employment and 
inequality. The period from the 
mid-1980s until the early 1990s saw 
persistently large financial surpluses 
as a share of GDP in the domestic 
economy. This led to an increase in 
acquisition of financial assets by non-
financial corporations throughout the 
1980s that fuelled the rapid expansion 
of, and developments in, the financial 
sector made possible by a series of 
financial sector reforms.
From 1994 onwards the economy 
went from being a net lender to a net 
borrower from the rest of the world. 
These (largely short-term) inflows 
fuelled financialisation of the domestic 
economy and the further expansion of 
the financial sector. 
The form that financialisation has 
taken in South Africa is conditioned 
upon the historical development 
of finance and industry during the 
period of apartheid and shaped by the 
macroeconomic policies of the post-
liberation era. In this way, the long-
run development trajectory of South 
Africa does not conform to one of the 
four dominant types: (a) debt-driven 
consumption boom; (b) domestic 
demand-led; (c) weakly export-led; or 
(d) export-led mercantilist). Rather, 
South Africa’s growth trajectory is 
characterised by a combination of 
these processes that differ in relative 
importance at different times. Growth 
in the 1960s and 70s was largely 
driven by domestic investment and 
consumption. The crisis of the 1980s 
saw considerable divestment and 
an overall reduction in investment. 
The 1990s saw an increase in the 
importance of exports as a key driver of 
growth and the period since 2000 has 
seen consumption led growth driven 
by debt and an increasing significance 
in gross capital formation attached 




Paradoxically, the period of majority 
rule has seen worsening inequality in 
the income and wealth distributions. 
At the top of the income distribution 
this is driven in part by the increased 
income derived from financial assets 
and asset inflation and the highly 
unequal distribution of financial assets 
across income groups. Unemployment 
is a major factor for income inequality 
and this has its roots in the structure of 
the economy and de-industrialisation 
associated with financialisation. 
Wage inequality is the main driver 
of inequality in South Africa. Again, 
its association with financialisation 
comes from corporate restructuring 
associated with financialisation, 
namely downsizing and outsourcing 
of non-key functions and increasingly 
precarious employment standards and 
high levels of informality that place 
downward pressures on wages for low-
skilled jobs. 
There have been significant changes 
in the composition of racial inequality 
in that income inequality within racial 
groups has become increasingly more 
significant than inequality between 
racial groups. (Leibbrant et al. 2010) It 
might be argued that neoliberalism 
and financialised accumulation have 
replaced the system of apartheid as the 
drivers of inequality in South Africa. 
Income inequality, as measured by 
the inverted Pareto-Lorenz coefficient 
is higher today than for any time 
during National Party rule. The most 
dramatic increase in income has been 
experienced by the top 10% of the 
population who saw an increase of 
4.2 percentage points in their share of 
total income between 1993 and 2008. 
The income share of the bottom 10% 
increased by 1.36 percentage points. 
The income share of the second to 
ninth deciles each saw a reduction 
in income share. Changes in the 
distribution of income and patterns of 
income growth mirror the distribution 
of financial assets held by households 
across the income distribution. 
Moreover, the effect of 
financialisation on inequality has 
largely occurred via its effect on 
employment and has its roots in the 
industrial structure which is heavily 
skewed towards capital intensive 
industries connected to extractive 
industries. The wage share of GDP 
fluctuated around 55% from the 1940s 
until late 1970s. From the early 1980s a 
downward trend in the wage share of 
The most dramatic 
increase in income 
has been experienced 
by the top 10% of the 
population who saw 
an increase of 4.2 
percentage points in 
their share of total 
income. 
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GDP can be discerned. This downward 
trend mirrors the upward trend in 
the profit share of GDP over the same 
period.
Non-financial corporations in South 
Africa have been acquiring high levels 
of financial assets in lieu of productive 
investment since the 1980s, prior to the 
period of financialisation, as a result 
of political and economic uncertainty. 
Since 1994, fixed investment has 
recovered somewhat but with no 
commensurate reduction in financial 
investment. Non-financial corporations 
in South Africa use banks and capital 
markets to increase their financial 
and speculative positions. Evidence 
presented suggests that the share-
holder preference channel is relatively 
weak. There is an evident preference 
by firms for financial investments 
generating short- term returns.
FINANCIALISATION AND 
CONSUMPTION
The relationship between 
financialisation and consumption 
varies across income groups. In 
aggregate, consumption as a share 
of GDP has been relatively stable, 
fluctuating between 60 and 65%t. At 
the same time, household disposable 
income, as a share, has been declining 
dramatically. There has been increasing 
levels of indebtedness at all levels 
of income distribution. At the upper 
deciles of the income distribution 
this is related to mortgage and 
consumption loans. The poor have also 
increased their reliance on credit for 
consumption but this has been driven 
by high levels of unemployment, 
precarious employment relations and 
unstable incomes. 
Consumption as a share of GDP 
fell throughout the apartheid period 
until 1980 when the trend turned 
positive until the early 1990s when 
consumption as a percentage of 
GDP stabilises at around 64 per cent. 
Between 2000 and 2007, domestic 
consumption was the strongest 
driver of growth year on year. Debt 
driven consumption in South Africa is 
concentrated in the relatively wealthy 
sections of society and has facilitated 
the increased acquisition of financial 
assets by some households without an 
associated fall in consumption.
The savings and investment 
behaviour of households has changed 
profoundly since the 1970s. Data shows 
without forgoing current consumption. 
The period from 1995 to 2007 saw a fall 
in the share of wages to household 
disposable income that resulted in 
the growing significance of property 
income. The post financial crisis period 
has seen wages increase in importance 
as a source of household income.. 
Amongst the components of assets 
and debts, financial asset are the most 
unequally distributed. The top decile in 
the wealth distribution own 85& of all 
assets and the top 5% hold 75% (Finn, 
Leibbrandt & Levinsohn 2012).
 Financialisation has led to 
changes in the savings and investment 
behaviour of the 25% of households 
at the top of the income and wealth 
distribution. For these households, 
future income and consumption have 
become highly integrated with capital 
markets as they increasingly depend 
upon dividend and interest payments 
and stock prices. This, together with 
the lack of access to financial assets and 
credit for the majority has profound 
implications on income and wealth 
inequality. (Ashman, Mohamed & 
Newman 2013). The project of ‘financial 
inclusion’ has also seen increasing 
indebtedness in the lower deciles of the 
income distribution.
FINANCIALISATION AND 
INVESTMENT IN THE CAPITAL 
STOCK
Because of its lack of integration 
with econ omic activities more 
broadly, expansion of the MEC-core 
(Minerals –Energy Complex) has 
occurred in relative isolation from, 
and at the expense of, non- MEC 
sectors, in particular labour intensive 
manufacturing of consumer goods. 
A major corollary of this has been an 
industrial structure skewed in favour of 
capital intensive, heavy, industries with 
limited labour absorption that have 
made up between 50 and 62 per cent of 
total manufacturing output since the 
1970s. 
Since 2006, the ratio 
of net savings to 
disposable income 
for households 
has been below 
zero, representing 
dissaving
a long-run declining trend in the 
aggregate propensity of households 
to save out of disposable income 
since 1960. Since 2006, the ratio of 
net savings to disposable income 
for households has been below 
zero, representing dissaving, which 
has occurred as a result of growing 
indebtedness (increased incurrence of 
financial liabilities) and not a fall in 
the acquisition of financial assets by 
households. 
Households receive around 50% 
of total credit extended to the private 
sector each year. The bulk of credit 
received by households has been in 
mortgages. Mortgage lending has been 
increasing as a share of GDP since the 
early 1990s. 
Consumption credit allowed 
households in aggregate to expand 
their acquisition of financial assets 
Issue 65 - New Agenda 13
MEC sectors continued to dominate 
in domestic value-addition until the 
2000s when finance and business 
services took over as the largest 
contributor to domestic GVA. The 
late 1980s and the 1990s saw the rapid 
divestment and decline of non-MEC 
manufacturing sectors. Economic 
growth since 1994 has been driven by 
financial and business service sectors. 
Investment in the capital stock 
stagnated in the 1980s as the debt 
crisis, the crisis of apartheid and 
economic sanctions culminated into 
a situation where domestic capital 
was reluctant to invest. But despite 
the transition to democracy in 1994, 
investment in the capital stock did 
not pick up until 2002. This increase 
in investment has been highly uneven 
in terms of its distribution across 
industrial sectors, and has largely 
been driven by state sanctioned 
infrastructure mega projects that 
include provisions for the 2010 Soccer 
World Cup, energy and port expansion. 
In 2013, the country planned to spend 
close to R1trillion on infrastructure 
(KPMG 2013). If one was to net out 
the infrastructure spends from fixed 
capital stock, we would show a picture 
of stagnant investment. In the section 
that follows, the evolution of the 
investment behaviour of non-financial 
corporations will be discussed. 
Traditionally, under a 
‘productionist’ model, firms 
reinvested significant portions of the 
surplus obtained from production 
to increase the capital stock and 
thus the productive base of the 
firm. The ‘productionist’ model 
saw firms as the core site of capital 
accumulation. By contrast, the process 
of financialisation, or a ‘financialised’ 
business model, sees an increase in 
firms’ financial operations and motives. 
The financialised firm has a very 
different relationship with the financial 
sector, itself transformed from simple 
intermediary between households’ 
savings and firms’ investment into 
regulator of firm and household 
behaviour. (Froud et al. 2002) One 
dimension of this is the tying 
together of firm performance with 
performance of its stocks and shares 
on capital markets associated with the 
shareholder value movement. 
Financial assets as a percentage of 
fixed capital stock has been increasing 
since the 1980s. Rather than signalling 
the onset of financialisation, the 
increase between 1980 and the early 
1990s should be interpreted as the 
consequence of economic sanctions, 
tight capital controls and keeping 
capital within the country together 
with the reluctance to invest in physical 
investments for fear of seizure in the 
case of the political transition. This 
period also saw an increase in the share 
of income from financial investment. 
We now look at the evolution of 
the retention ratio for non-financial 
corporations listed on the JSE. Higher 
retention ratios are suggestive of 
investment by firms which fits with 
rapid increases in the capital stock 
since the mid-2000s. We should be 
cautious at drawing such a conclusion, 
however, without a closer look at the 
way in which firms finance investment 
and the types of investment that they 
finance. As we have already seen, 
the increase in capital expenditures 
by firms was not accompanied by 
a commensurate decrease in the 
acquisition of financial assets. Income 
from financial investments increased 
from around R750,000 million to 
around R1.1trillion between 2006 
and 2007, and continues to increase 
thereafter.
FINANCIALISATION AND THE 
CURRENT ACCOUNT
South Africa has been running a 
persistently large current account 
deficit since the late 1990s which has 
been financed by massive capital 
inflows attracted by high domestic 
interest rates. Capital account 
liberalisation in South Africa has 
resulted in capital flight and the 
expansion of short-term portfolio 
inflows that have financed short-term 
credit expansion by the banking sector. 
The global financial crisis had the 
initial effect of a contraction in export 
value, but more importantly a sharp 
contraction in portfolio inflows and 
hence a squeeze on credit that had 
the immediate impact of contraction 
in manufacturing and wholesale and 
retail trade sectors. While further 
relaxing of capital controls saw 
rapid recovery in financial flows, 
manufacturing has not recovered. 
This has had the effect of shifting the 
distribution of employment for low 
and medium skilled workers towards 
lower paid service sectors. South Africa 
did not suffer the contagion effects 
owing to its relatively low exposure 
to toxic US assets and low levels of 
securitisation.
South Africa ran a current account 
surplus from 1985 until 1993. During 
this period there was a sustained 
outflow of capital seeking a safe haven 
from the political and economic 
instability and uncertainty that 
pervaded South Africa.
In addition to official outflows 
of capital, capital flight has been a 
constant feature in South Africa’s 
Income from financial 
investments increased 
from around R750,000 
million to around 
R1.1trillion between 
2006 and 2007, and 
continues to increase 
thereafter
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capital flows. Mohamed and Finnoff 
(2005) estimated that capital flight as 
percentage of GDP increased from an 
average of 5.4 per cent a year between 
1980 and 1993 to 9.2 per cent between 
1994 and 2000. Ashman et al. (2011) 
calculated that there was a further 
increase in capital flight as percentage 
of GDP to 12 per cent on average 
between 2001 and 2007. Net exports 
peaked in 2001, following a contraction 
in imports in 1999 and little growth in 
2000. Since then, net exports has been 
in decline, becoming negative from 
2004. Imports have continued to be 
greater than exports since 2004. 
High interest rates in South Africa 
have attracted substantial short-term 
inflows as part of an increasing trend in 
carry-trade from advanced economies 
where interest rates have been low. 
In addition to financing of the 
current account deficit, the rapid and 
extensive liberalisation of exchange 
controls have in essence regularised 
much of the illegal outflow of capital 
from the South African Economy which 
was estimated to be as much as 20% of 
GDP in 2007 (Ashman et al. 2011). 
Unlike the financialised economies 
of the global north, the financial sector 
hardly took a hit. The South African 
economy has relatively little exposure 
to US toxic assets. There has been little 
securitisation of banking sector assets 
- in 2007, only 3% of mortgages were 
securitised. 
By contrast, manufacturing took 
a much harder hit and has failed to 
recover. As already discussed above, 
financialisation contributed to the 
long-run decline in manufacturing in 
South Africa. Manufacturing output in 
the first quarter of 2009 declined by 12.8 
per cent (compared with a 6.8 per cent 
decline in GDP overall). Other sectors 
that saw similar contractions included 
retail and wholesale trade. 484,000 
workers lost their jobs in the third 
quarter of 2009, 150,000 of these were 
from manufacturing. Employment in 
manufacturing has not recovered since. 
To summarise, the relatively low 
levels of securitisation and limited 
exposure to toxic US assets meant that 
contagion effects from international 
financial markets were few. The main 
transmission mechanisms have been 
through a contraction of export value 
from falling commodity prices and 
a contraction in portfolio inflows 
that led to a credit squeeze that had 
a disproportionately negative effect 
on manufacturing industries that 
have on the whole failed to recover. 
The financial sector benefited from 
further capital account liberalisation 
that financed a rapid recovery in credit 
extension that has led to a recovery in 
consumption and therefore wholesale 
and retail sectors. Overall aggregate 
performance was supported by on- 
going large infrastructure spend. 
In a sense, economic policies have 
dampened the crisis at the macro 
level but has further cemented the 
process of financialisation and its 
implications for domestic investment 
and inequality.
The complete study on Financialisation in South 
Africa by Susan Newman can be obtained from 
FESSUD: www.fessud.eu
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